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Relevance Theory (RT: Sperber & Wilson, 1986) argues that human language 
comprehension processes tend to maximize “relevance”, and postulates that there is a 
relevance-based procedure that a hearer follows when trying to understand an 
utterance. Despite being highly influential, RT has been criticized for its failure to 
explain how speaker-related information, either the speaker’s abilities or her/his 
preferences, is incorporated into the hearer’s inferential, pragmatic process. An 
alternative proposal is that speaker-related information gains prominence due to 
representation of the speaker within higher-level goal-directed schemata. Yet the goal-
based account is still unable to explain clearly how cross-domain information, for 
example linguistic meaning and speaker-related knowledge, is integrated within a 
modular system. On the basis of RT’s cognitive requirements, together with 
contemporary cognitive theory, we argue that this integration is realized by utilizing 
working memory and that there exist conversational constraints with which the 
constructed utterance interpretation should be consistent. We illustrate our arguments 
with a computational implementation of the proposed processes within a general 
cognitive architecture. 
Keywords: pragmatics; relevance theory; relevance-based comprehension 
procedure; spreading activation; monitoring 
1. Introduction 
Relevance Theory (RT) was developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986) in an attempt to 
capture general principles that govern pragmatic interpretation. Sperber and Wilson argued 
that the four maxims posited by Grice (1975) in his theory of conversational implicature 
(quantity, quality, relation, and manner) overlap with each other, and developed RT by 
building on just one Gricean maxim, that of relation (i.e., “be relevant”: Grice, 1975, p. 46). 
RT is based on two principles: the cognitive principle of relevance and the communicative 
principle of relevance. The former specifies that human cognition tends to maximize 
relevance while according to the latter every ostensive stimulus conveys to the hearer a 
presumption of its optimal relevance. Sperber and Wilson (2002) subsequently developed the 
relevance-based comprehension procedure (RBCP) – a procedure that a hearer is held to 
follow when trying to understand an utterance. The first part of the RBCP postulates that the 
hearer takes the path of least effort in searching for an interpretation, while the second part 
tells the hearer to terminate the search process when the interpretive hypothesis is optimally 
relevant, or specifically, “the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities 
and preferences” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 270). 
 
Since its formulation, RT has been highly influential. It has been applied widely in 
discourse analysis (e.g., Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008; Schourup, 2011; Ifantidou, 2014; Yus 
Ramos 2016) as well as translation studies (e.g., Gutt, 2004; Díaz-Pérez, 2015).  RT has also 
been the topic of many research treatises and anthologies (e.g., Blakemore, 1987; Carston & 
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Uchida, 1997; Rouchota & Jucker, 1998; Walaszewska & Piskorska, 2012; Clark, 2013; 
Padilla Cruz, 2016). And yet RT has never been free from criticisms. While most criticisms 
have focused on the vagueness of the principles and the inability of the theory to be falsified 
(e.g., Bach 1994; Levinson, 1989, 2000; Burton-Roberts, 2007; Soria & Romero, 2010; Davis, 
2014; Mazzone, 2015), specific aspects of the RBCP, such as how the path of least effort is 
taken, or how speaker-related information is incorporated into the pragmatic process, have 
received relatively little critical evaluation. 
 
In fact, such questions arose from the debates between Carston (2007), herself a relevance 
theorist, and Recanati (2002, 2004), who proposed dividing the unitary inferential pragmatic 
process (as posited by RT) into two processes: an accessibility-based primary process and a 
Gricean inferential secondary process. According to Recanati, explicature (“what is said” in 
Recanati’s sense) is derived through the primary process by selecting the most activated 
interpretive candidate for a given constituent when semantic disambiguation or referent 
resolution is required. This process is argued to be independent of the speaker’s mental states 
or beliefs. In contrast, Carston (2007) argued that when a sentential component has multiple 
potential semantic values, the most accessible need not be the one that should be chosen, 
because the speaker’s knowledge, such as his or her beliefs or desires, has to be taken into 
consideration. She described the following scenario:  
My student Sarah is walking along with me in the department of linguistics. 
Suddenly Sarah says to me “Neil has broken his leg.” 
“Neil” might refer to either Carston’s son Neil1 or one of her colleagues Neil2. So in this case, 
both individuals named “Neil” are activated. If Carston’s son frequently gets into trouble and 
she has been constantly worried about him, Neil1 will be chosen as the referent because he is 
more accessible. However, considering that Sarah does not know that Carston’s son is named 
“Neil”, and that Neil2 is Sarah’s syntax teacher, Carston instead selects Neil2 to be the correct 
(i.e., intended) interpretation of “Neil”. 
 
Carston points out that according to Recanati’s account, Neil1 should be selected as the 
referent as it is more accessible, but it is the wrong interpretation. At the same time, Carston 
argues that this case can be easily explained from the relevance-theoretic perspective. 
According to the RBCP, the more accessible candidate, Neil1, is chosen as the referent and 
checked against the speaker’s abilities and preferences. If they are found to be inconsistent, 
the comprehension process will continue since the chosen referent Neil1 fails to arrive at 
optimal relevance. The alternative option Neil2 is then selected and the checking process 
repeats to ensure that it matches the speaker’s knowledge about the referent.  
 
In his response to Carston, Recanati (2007) restates that his proposed primary process 
includes two stages.
1
 In the first stage the candidate of higher accessibility is chosen while in 
the second “accessibility shift” occurs (or specifically, the initially less accessible candidate 
Neil2 becomes more activated later). He further suggests the second stage is triggered by the 
speaker’s specific knowledge about the selected referent. But this proposal contradicts his 
account of the primary pragmatic process as one that does not taken into consideration the 
speaker’s mental states. Moreover, it does not specify why the speaker’s knowledge about a 
specific individual should become active.  
 
Mazzone (2013) further indicates that, apart from Recanati’s accessibility-based primary 
pragmatic process, RT faces a similar problem concerning the interpretation of “Neil” (and 
                                                 
1
 Recanati (2004) previously mentioned this point. 
3  
referent resolution more generally). Optimal relevance requires compatibility of the 
interpretive hypothesis with the speaker’s abilities and preferences, but it fails to illustrate 
why only the specific piece of information (e.g., Sarah does not know Neil1) is retrieved and 
integrated into the cognitive process as a contextual assumption.  
 
Mazzone attempts to explain how speaker-related information enters the pragmatic 
interpretation by following the association-based account of Recanati. He proposes that 
activation of speaker-related information is enhanced due to the representation of the speaker 
in the hearer’s working memory (2013, p. 112). But this proposal doesn’t differ much from 
the cognitive principle of relevance. The latter enables the hearer to allocate cognitive 
resources in an optimal way to “bring about the greatest contribution to the mind’s general 
cognitive goals at the smallest processing cost” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 48). The hearer’s 
goal is to understand the speaker’s communicative intention, so it is necessary to pay enough 
attention to the speaker to maximize relevance, which naturally leads to the representation of 
the speaker gaining access to working memory. It seems that Mazzone’s solution just 
translates the cognitive principle into associative terms. Mazzone (2015) further proposes that 
pragmatic processing is both governed and driven by higher-level goal-directed schemata and 
that speaker-related information receives prominence through top-down processing.  
 
Seen from the above, both Mazzone and relevance theorists support the view that pragmatic 
understanding constitutes a unitary cognitive process. The former suggests that associative 
processes (effected by spreading activation within hierarchical schemata) can realize the 
inferences posited by RT, while the latter focuses on the inferential process of seeking 
communicative intention attributed to the speaker by the hearer. 
 
In summary, RT neither specifies in detail how the least-effort path is achieved in 
searching for optimal relevance nor describes how speaker-related information might be 
incorporated into the pragmatic process of utterance comprehension at the architectural level. 
While Mazzone argued for a goal-based account of the Neil problem, his solution is not 
grounded in a complete and coherent model of cognition.  
 
In this paper we argue that Mazzone’s account is not incompatible with the assumptions 
held by RT. More specifically, we demonstrate that cases such as the Neil example may be 
addressed within a modified version of RT in which the basic theory is complimented with a 
goal-based view that includes production-like if/then rules. Furthermore, we suggest that this 
integration is realized by utilizing working memory and that there exist conversational 
constraints (or pragmatic schemata), which might be described in the form of production 
rules, with which a constructed utterance interpretation should be consistent. In order to 
support our argument, we present a computational model of utterance interpretative processes 
embedded within a contemporary cognitive architecture. The model illustrates two critical 
points: 1) that the accessibility order of different interpretive hypothesis of an utterance – an 
important step in the least-effort path – can be determined based on spreading activation; and 
2) that the RBCP can be complemented with conversational constraints to specify how 
speaker-related knowledge may enter the process of utterance interpretation and thereby 
implement the mechanisms required for pragmatic reasoning. 
 
2. Towards an Architecture for Pragmatic Interpretation 
Following the concerns raised in the introduction about, for example, the role of speaker 
related knowledge (and world knowledge more generally) in pragmatic interpretation, we 
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take the view that the processes involved in pragmatic interpretation cannot be understood in 
isolation from the rest of the cognitive system. In order to relate these processes to wider 
cognition we therefore consider how they may be embedded within a cognitive architecture, 
i.e., within a theory of the functional components of the mind and their interaction (Newell, 
1990). Several such theories have been proposed over the last 30 years, but a number of 
requirements of pragmatic interpretation appear to be met by the Contention Scheduling / 
Supervisory System (CS/SS) architecture, originally proposed by Norman and Shallice 
(1986). CS/SS proposes that routine or over-learned tasks are performed by an automatic 
system (CS), in which hierarchically-organised units compete for control of thought and 
behaviour through activation-based processing. In non-routine situations or where 
deliberate/intentional control is required, the operation of CS may be biased by SS, which 
may selectively excite or inhibit units within CS so as to achieve specific goals. SS consists 
of several functional subsystems. One of these monitors the processing of other subsystems to 
ensure that processing coheres with on-going goals and expectations, while another performs 
goal-directed problem solving and planning (see Shallice & Burgess, 1996, for a preliminary 
general decomposition of SS, and Sood & Cooper, 2013, and Sexton & Cooper, 2014, for 
more recent computational implementations in specific tasks).  
 
Although the CS/SS architecture was originally proposed to explain cognitive control of 
external actions, Norman & Shallice (1986) point it out that this architecture can “apply to 
internal actions—actions that only involve the cognitive processing mechanisms” (p. 1). The 
specific analysis in Norman & Shallice’s work also indicates the CS/SS architecture allows 
for the involvement of additional special-purpose cognitive subsystems (such as those 
concerned, for example, with language or number processing). Such features of CS/SS, 
combined with its successful implementations in different specific tasks, make it possible to 
apply this cognitive theory to pragmatic interpretation.  
2.1 The High-Level Organization of Cognitive Processes for Pragmatic 
Interpretation 
In order to apply the CS/SS architecture to the task of pragmatic interpretation, it is necessary 
to specify which aspects of pragmatic interpretation fall within the operation of CS and, for 
those aspects that do not, what supervisory processes are required. Consider first the 
processes and knowledge stores that must contribute to the pragmatic interpretation process, 
such that it might be influenced by speaker-related knowledge. We assume that the 
interpretation process contributes to or constructs a mental model of the topic of conversation 
(i.e., a situational model), and that this model is accessible to other cognitive processes. 
Within the CS/SS theory, the most parsimonious approach is to assume that the situational 
model is maintained in a task-general working memory. 
 
The process of generating an interpretation for an utterance needs access to one’s 
knowledge of the world (e.g., of people named “Neil”). We assume that the process of 
generating an initial or preliminary interpretation is routinized and automatic (and either 
performed by CS or by a special purpose linguistic subsystem operating along similar lines). 
However, as noted above, a key element of SS is a monitoring process, and such a process 
satisfies the functional requirement of ensuring that the situational model constructed in 
working memory during utterance interpretation is coherent. We suggest that this monitoring 
process also serves to ensure that any preliminary interpretation of an utterance is consistent 
with the rules or constraints of pragmatic interpretation (i.e., in the language of RT, that the 
interpretation matches the speaker’s abilities and preferences). Where an interpretation fails 
to satisfy pragmatic conventions, the monitoring process must reject the interpretation. We 
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assume that rejection of an interpretation results in the search for and subsequent generation 
of an alternative interpretation. This process is goal-directed and non-automatic, and must 
therefore recruit processes beyond CS (i.e., we envisage the process of revising an 
interpretation to draw on supervisory processes). 
 
The relevant processes and knowledge stores, with their interconnections based on this 
discussion, are shown in Figure 1. It should be stressed that this figure shows the 
hypothesised information processing components and the channels between them that licence 
the exchange of information. It is more akin to a circuit diagram than a flow chart. The 
following sections further motivate and clarify the function of each of the components in the 
figure. Additional details of the operation of critical components are provided in the appendix. 
2.2 The Generation of Interpretations 
As indicated in Figure 1, we assume that separate stages are involved in the generation of an 
initial interpretation and, where that interpretation is found to violate pragmatic conventions, 
the generation of a revised interpretation. For expository purposes we treat these as distinct 
and separable cognitive processes. The initial process takes verbal input and incrementally 
builds an interpretation drawing on salient world knowledge. This interpretation is added to 
Working Memory in piecemeal fashion (i.e., as each syntactic sub-constituent is parsed), 
where it is assumed to augment the situational model being constructed in response to the 
current conversation. As noted above, we assume that this initial process, which includes 
parsing the verbal input, is either effected by the Contention Scheduling system or performed 
by a special-purpose subsystem that is governed by the same principles. That is, we assume it 
is automatic, activation-based, and driven by the most salient representations in the world 
knowledge store (Cooper & Shallice, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 1. Critical architectural processes in the model of pragmatic interpretation. Rounded 
rectangular boxes depict buffers that store information or maintain representations. 
Hexagonal boxes depict processes that manipulate or transform those representations. 
Rectangular boxes represent compound components with internal structure. Arrows 
represent inter-component communication channels, with standard arrowheads indicating 
the sending of information and inverted triangular arrowheads indicating the reading of 
information. The diagram should be read as a circuit diagram, not a flow chart. In principle, 
each component functions in parallel. 
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Units within CS encode cognitive or motor actions in terms of hierarchical relations and 
“triggering conditions”. For example, in previous work on action control, units have encoded 
action associations such as “if the higher-level context is to add milk to a beverage and a non-
empty milk container is held then it may be poured into the beverage container”. Analogous 
structures may be used to encode cognitive operations such as “if the context requires 
interpretation of a name and a person by that name is known, then the name refers to that 
person”. It is assumed that a large number of units coexist and that each unit has an 
associated activation value which receives excitation to the degree that its triggering 
conditions are met by sensory input, representations in Working Memory and/or salient 
representations in World Knowledge. The binding of object representations to a unit’s 
argument roles (e.g., which container should the milk be poured into, or which individual 
named Neil should serve as the referent of “Neil”) is determined by the salience or activation 
of object representations in the representation of the world. Contention Scheduling concepts 
therefore fulfil the requirements of an initial interpretative process. 
 
A subsequent stage is assumed to be triggered when Monitoring detects that the situational 
model maintained in Working Memory is inconsistent (either internally or with the contents 
of World Knowledge). The Revise Interpretation process of Figure 1 performs this 
subsequent stage. It requires access to broad knowledge of the world (i.e., knowledge beyond 
that recruited by the immediate interpretation of the current conversation), and must be 
capable of performing arbitrarily complex reasoning. These properties are characteristic of 
the Supervisory System. 
2.3 The Role of Working Memory 
Any account of sentence interpretation is likely to require some kind of storage system to 
maintain the outcome of the interpretation process. We assume that this outcome is 
maintained in a general purpose working memory. We moreover assume as noted above that 
the outcome of interpretation is some kind of mental model of the situation being discussed, 
in which individuals and their properties and inter-relations are represented. The model must 
be veridical (i.e., its truth or falsity can in principle be ascertained) and so we assume that the 
component parts of the model are definite (i.e., held to be either true or false, and not 
probabilistic). At the same time there is no requirement that the model be internally 
consistent – ensuring consistency is the role of Monitoring, which as discussed below, is 
potentially unreliable. Lastly, the situational model must be accessible to processes beyond 
the initial interpretative process, so as a) to allow checking by the monitoring process, b) to 
feed into the generation of alternative interpretations if needed, and c) to be accessible to 
wider cognition in order to support action based on the interpretation (e.g., coherent 
engagement in an on-going conversation). 
2.4 The Role of World Knowledge 
We assume that world knowledge may be brought to bear in utterance interpretation and that 
this knowledge is represented within an activation-based store in which activation spreads 
between related concepts. Those concepts that are most active are most likely to play a role in 
the interpretation process. Thus, in the case of the Neil example, we assume that both 
individuals named “Neil” are represented in the hearer’s store of world knowledge, but that 
the hearer’s son is initially the more active of the two due to the hearer’s personal 
associations and recent cognitive history (e.g., she has recently been thinking about her son).  
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The CS/SS architecture assumes that relevant aspects of world knowledge are represented 
in activation-based terms (as required by our model), but it does not provide a detailed 
account of activation within this knowledge store. Other cognitive architectures, in particular 
ACT-R, however, do. Thus ACT-R assumes that concepts (or “chunks” in ACT-R 
terminology) have an activation level that determines their accessibility in declarative 
memory and that a concept’s activation level is determined by its history of use (which 
includes a recency bias) and its associations with related active concepts (cf. Anderson, 2007). 
We assume a similar mechanism operates within the CS/SS architecture, and with this, the 
activation of the two individuals named “Neil” may be used such that the one with the 
greatest activation is more accessible to the hearer. This accounts for the first part of the 
RBCP: that the hearer generates and tests the interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility. 
 
Accessing the second possible referent for “Neil” requires that the rank order of activations 
of the two individuals named “Neil” be reversed. This is achieved indirectly by the Revise 
Interpretation process, which may function either by deliberately inhibiting the 
representation of Neil-the-son and/or by deliberately exciting the representation of others 
known by the same name. 
2.5 Monitoring and Epistemic Vigilance 
The existence of monitoring as a task-general process is well supported by 
neuropsychological evidence (see Shallice & Cooper, 2011, for a review). Monitoring must 
have access to information from multiple sources (including World Knowledge and Working 
Memory), but it may be computationally relatively simple in that it detects (but does not 
attempt to resolve) inconsistencies in the situational model or mismatches between 
expectations and that model. It may be specified in terms of acquired goal-specific schemas 
that encode (amongst other things) pragmatic constraints (e.g., that the speaker has 
knowledge of a referent). 
 
Psychological evidence (e.g., concerning action slips and lapses in everyday behaviour: 
Norman, 1981; Reason, 1984) suggests that monitoring is an imperfect process. It is subject 
to attentional failure and can be misled by confirmation bias (i.e., mismatches may not be 
detected if they are consistent with strongly held beliefs). Moreover, it is not in itself a 
conscious process, though the outcome of monitoring mismatch detection generally will be, 
because detection of such failures will typically trigger processes needed to resolve those 
mismatches (e.g., triggering search for an alternative pragmatically appropriate interpretation). 
 
There is a close relation between monitoring and the concept of epistemic vigilance as 
introduced by Sperber et al. (2010) and extended by Mazzarella (2013, 2015a). Sperber et al. 
(2010) argue that epistemic vigilance and mind reading abilities develop simultaneously (so 
one can represent the speaker’s beliefs and detect the mismatch between one’s interpretation 
and those beliefs) and that the former is utilised to check the reliability of an utterance’s 
source and the believability of the content. Mazzarella (2015a) extends the function of 
epistemic vigilance from discovering inconsistency to modulating the expectations of optimal 
relevance that drive the RBCP and determine its stopping point. Thus, Mazzarella proposed 
three types of expected optimal relevance corresponding to the three comprehension 
strategies of Sperber (1994): 
(1) Naive optimists presuppose that the speaker is honest and that his or her utterance has 
an evidential basis. The hearer who adopts this strategy will regard the first 
interpretation that is relevant enough to be the meaning of the utterance.  
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(2) Cautious optimists also believe in the honesty of the speaker, but they might doubt 
that the speaker correctly estimates what the hearer knows, such as what is the most 
accessible or relevant to the hearer under the given circumstance. 
(3) Sophisticated interpreters, in contrast, drop the assumptions that the speaker is 
benevolent and competent. They select the interpretation that seems adequately 
relevant to the speaker. 
 
In other words, epistemic vigilance mechanisms, according to Mazzarella (2015a), can 
check not only the constructed utterance meaning against the communicator’s competence 
and benevolence, but also determine what version of the RBCP to deploy. The relation 
between epistemic vigilance and monitoring is further examined in Section 4.2. 
 
3. A Worked Example: Implementation of the Neil Problem 
In this section we demonstrate the model by showing its operation when processing Carston’s 
critical sentence “Neil has broken his leg”. The model takes as input one word at a time, and 
builds semantic units which are placed in Working Memory bit by bit to form a situation 
model. Binding of referents is also done bit by bit, as and when sufficient information is 
available to identify potential referents. We consider the functioning of each of the five boxes 
in Figure 1 throughout processing of the target sentence. 
 
The hearer’s World Knowledge is assumed to contain, amongst many other items, 
knowledge (or belief) that: 
a) Neil-the-son is named “Neil” 
b) Neil-the-colleague is named “Neil” 
c) Neil-the-son is not known to Sarah 
d) Neil-the-colleague is known to Sarah 
Contents of World Knowledge (at cycle 14): 
0: knows(sarah,neil_colleague,true). 0.4382 
0: knows(sarah,neil_son,false). 0.5537 
0: name(neil_son,neil). 0.4883 
0: name(neil_colleague,neil). 0.1979 
 
Contents of Working Memory (at cycle 14): 
14: metadata(refers_to,utterance_2,ind_1).  
14: name(ind_1,neil).  
14: entity(ind_1).  
2: metadata(speaker,utterance_2,sarah).  
 
Figure 2. Contents of World Knowledge and Working Memory after initial processing of the 
word “Neil”. Note that processing is cyclic, and the number at the left of each line indicates 
the cycle on which the element was added to the store. Thus, all elements in World 
Knowledge were present at initialisation (cycle 0), while the elements in Working Memory 
were added as processing progressed. Elements in World Knowledge have associated 
activation values, and these are shown to the right of each element. These were initialised to 
0.5, 0.5, 0.5 and 0.2 respectively, but are subject to noise and hence vary slightly from cycle 
to cycle. 
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It is moreover assumed that, when Sarah begins her utterance, the activation of element a) is 
higher than that of element b), reflecting the fact that Carston (the hearer) is particularly 
concerned about Neil-the-son. (Presumably all of Carston’s beliefs about Neil-the-son have 
elevated activation, due to this concern.) For expository purposes we assume an initial 
activation of 0.50 for element a) and of 0.20 for element b). 
 
When the speaker (Sarah) utters the first word of the phrase (“Neil”), subprocesses of 
Generate Interpretation parse the word and recognise it as a proper name. This results in the 
construction, in Working Memory, of the beginnings of the situational model. Figure 2 shows 
the contents of the two key memory stores, World Knowledge and Working Memory at this 
stage. 
 
The presence of an unbound entity in the situational model immediately results in an 
attempt by Generate Interpretation to bind that entity to a known individual. Neil-the-son is 
selected as the corresponding individual due to the high activation of element a) compared to 
element b) in World Knowledge (cf. Figure 2). The result is shown in Figure 3. 
 
A pragmatic schema within Monitoring then detects that Neil-the-son is believed to be not 
known by Sarah (the speaker), and so the assignment of the new entity to Neil-the-son is 
retracted. The resultant contents of the key memory stores are similar to those in Figure 2. 
The lack of a valid assignment of an individual to the referent of “Neil” then results in Revise 
Interpretation searching for an alternative interpretation. This results in excitation of 
knowledge of other individuals named Neil (and/or inhibition of knowledge related to Neil-
the-son within World Knowledge). Consequently, knowledge that “Neil” may refer to Neil-
the-colleague becomes more active than the corresponding knowledge that it may refer to 
Neil-the-son, as shown in Figure 4.  
 
The mechanism for assigning known individuals to entities in the situational model (which 
is technically part of the Generate Interpretation process) then retrieves Neil-the-colleague as 
an alternative referent for “Neil”. 
 
Contents of World Knowledge (at cycle 15): 
0: knows(sarah,neil_colleague,true). 0.4308 
0: knows(sarah,neil_son,false). 0.5480 
0: name(neil_son,neil). 0.4780 
0: name(neil_colleague,neil). 0.2416 
 
Contents of Working Memory (at cycle 15): 
15: identity(ind_1, neil_son).  
14: metadata(refers_to,utterance_2,ind_1).  
14: name(ind_1,neil).  
14: entity(ind_1).  
2: metadata(speaker,utterance_2,sarah).  
Figure 3. Contents of World Knowledge and Working Memory after initial resolution of the 
referent of the word “Neil”. On cycle 15, the individual in the situational model introduced 
by the proper noun “Neil” is identified with Neil-the-son. 
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While all of this is happening, further words are being uttered by the speaker and being 
integrated into the hearer’s situational model. Figure 5 shows the contents of the key memory 
stores once the full utterance is processed. 
 
The above is a detailed explanation of how the explicature is derived through the 
interaction of various cognitive mechanisms. The binding between the semantic unit of the 
proper noun Neil and the referent is based on activation strength of the candidates, and this 
process well instantiates how interpretive hypotheses are acquired in order of accessibility. 
The checking of compatibility of the interpretative hypothesis against speaker’s abilities is 
accomplished by constraints in the monitoring system. 
 
4. Discussion 
We have elaborated the buffers and processes involved in the architecture of pragmatic 
interpretation, with the aim of grounding pragmatic interpretation in a theory of the cognitive 
architecture and illustrating in concrete terms how the theory solves referent resolution (and 
in particular, the Neil problem). Within our account and implementation, humans construct 
an interpretive hypothesis based on the activation strength of different meanings, but a 
monitoring mechanism functions to detect any inconsistency between the interpretation and 
the information in the working memory or world knowledge of the hearer. This detection 
process is realized by checking acquired conversational constraints, and ensuring that the 
situational model is consistent with those constraints, triggering reinterpretation if a 
constraint is found to have been violated. This explains in computational terms how the shift 
from the preliminary interpretation of “Neil” to the subsequent one occurs. 
Contents of World Knowledge (at cycle 22): 
0: knows(sarah,neil_colleague,true). 0.4391 
0: knows(sarah,neil_son,false). 0.6052 
0: name(neil_son,neil). 0.4900 
0: name(neil_colleague,neil). 0.5116 
 
Contents of Working Memory (at cycle 22): 
14: metadata(refers_to,utterance_2,ind_1).  
14: name(ind_1,neil).  
14: entity(ind_1).  
2: metadata(speaker,utterance_2,sarah).  
Figure 4. Contents of World Knowledge and Working Memory after rejection of the initial 
solution of the referent of the word “Neil” and subsequent excitation of the other possible 
referent. On cycle 16, the identification of the individual in the situational model introduced 
by the proper noun “Neil” with Neil-the-son is retracted and knowledge related to any other 
individuals known by the name of Neil begins to be deliberately excited in the search for an 
alternative referent. By cycle 22, the activation of the critical knowledge linking the name to 
Neil-the-colleague exceeds the corresponding information related to Neil-the-son. This will 
allow Neil-the-colleague to be retrieved on cycle 23. 
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4.1 Reconsidering the Debate between Relevance Theory and Association-based 
Accounts 
As described in the introduction, both relevance theorists and Recanati mention the shift from 
the preliminary interpretation to the alternative one in the Neil case. The former resorts to 
optimal relevance that requires the compatibility of the interpretive hypothesis with the 
speaker’s abilities and preferences, while the latter attributes it to the dynamic change of the 
two interpretive candidates’ activations in the second stage of the primary pragmatic process. 
Despite using different terms, relevance theorists’ account and Recanati’s explanation are 
essentially the same, as both concern a cognitive process that constructs an interpretive 
hypothesis and a confirmation process that finds the preliminary interpretation wrong and 
triggers a problem-solving process of searching for the alternative. However, both accounts 
lack elaboration of the mechanisms that implement the processes of deriving an interpretive 
hypothesis and evaluating the hypothesis. Our account bridges this gap by implementing the 
two component processes of “hypothesis formation” (based on the salience of each 
interpretive candidate) and “hypothesis confirmation” (in relation to world knowledge).2  
                                                 
2
 The two terms—“hypothesis formation” and “hypothesis confirmation” are borrowed from Mazzarella 
(2014). 
Contents of World Knowledge (at cycle 116): 
0: knows(sarah,neil_colleague,true). 0.5513 
0: knows(sarah,neil_son,false). 0.5279 
0: name(neil_son,neil). 0.4653 
0: name(neil_colleague,neil). 0.5185 
 
Contents of Working Memory (at cycle 116): 
116: is_male(ind_4)  
116: entity(ind_4).  
116: belongs_to(ind_3,ind_4).  
116: entity(ind_3).  
116: object(ev_2,ind_3).  
116: perfect_aspect(ev_1,ev_2).  
116: agent(ev_1,ind_1).  
110: metadata(refers_to,utterance_2,ind_3).  
110: isa(ind_3,leg).  
62: metadata(describes,utterance_2,ev_2).  
62: time(ev_2,past).  
62: type(ev_2,breaking).  
38: metadata(describes,utterance_2,ev_1).  
23: identity(ind_1, neil_colleague).  
14: metadata(refers_to,utterance_2,ind_1).  
14: name(ind_1,neil).  
14: entity(ind_1).  
2: metadata(speaker,utterance_2,sarah).  
Figure 5. Contents of World Knowledge and Working Memory after processing the entire 
utterance (“Neil has broken his leg”). Note that on cycle 23 ind_1 is identified (correctly) 




Our account differs from RT in terms of the specific cognitive mechanisms that implement 
the above two component processes. As seen from the implementation section, the two 
processes are effected by the interaction of different cognitive mechanisms within a broader 
architecture of mind. In contrast, relevance theorists take them to be performed by an 
autonomous, dedicated module (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Sperber 2004). 
Whether such a module exists is highly controversial (see Bloom, 2002, Woodward & Cowie, 
2004, and Cummings, 2015, for opposite views; see Sperber, 2000, 2005, for supportive 
arguments). Our account is therefore consistent with RT in terms of its theoretical proposal of 
the RBCP, but not its suggestion of a specialized module that completes this task at the level 
of implementation.  
 
Our account implements the two stages of the primary pragmatic process proposed by 
Recanati, but it is in no way equivalent to saying we support his dual-process account of 
pragmatic interpretation. Instead, the secondary process in our view is implemented by the 
same mechanisms as the primary process. Relevance theorists (e.g., Mazzarella, 2014) have 
emphasized that association-based processes lack the mechanism for hypothesis evaluation. 
Thus Mazzone puts forward the idea of attentional processes for “active maintenance and 
conscious monitoring of information” (2013, p. 113). However, he fails to connect his idea to 
a coherent cognitive framework to implement such associative processes. Our model, 
composed of components which are constructed based on a single cognitive theory—CS/SS, 
successfully implements what Recanati and Mazzone take associative processes to do (e.g., 
the functions of attentional processes mentioned above, corresponding respectively to the 
functions of Working Memory and Monitoring in our model).  
 
In this sense, our research provides a unitary account of utterance interpretation within the 
adapted cognitive framework of CS/SS, and shows that both the theoretical proposal of the 
RBCP and the association-based accounts may be implemented by the same cognitive 
modules, thereby effectively resolving the debate concerning the Neil example.  
4.2 Monitoring and Epistemic Vigilance Reconsidered 
As seen from the elaboration of Monitoring in Section 2.5, epistemic vigilance and 
Monitoring are different in terms of the specific tasks they serve. Epistemic vigilance, as 
described by Sperber et al. (2010) and Mazzarella (2015b), is specialized for verbal 
communication, but it has also been pointed out (as indicated in the footnote of Mazzarella, 
2014, p. 93) that the proposal of an epistemic vigilance module seems to be inconsistent with 
relevance theorists’ argument that the RBCP works as an autonomous module for inferential 
communication. Thus, Monitoring as we conceive of it, is a task-general process that 
encapsulates constraints or processing expectations (cf. Shallice & Cooper, 2011, pp. 367-
371). These constraints are goal-specific (so interpretative pragmatic constraints apply during 
utterance interpretation, but not when, for example, playing a musical instrument), and 
assumed to be acquired through experience. 
 
Despite the above difference, they also share some similarities. Firstly, Monitoring is 
functionally similar to epistemic vigilance. As mentioned earlier, epistemic vigilance tells us 
when to terminate the interpretation process by modulating the expected type of optimal 
relevance. The monitoring system can do a similar job through processing expectations for 
reinterpretation. For example, if the hearer expects to receive a specific type of answer (e.g., 
yes or no) but the speaker’s utterance literally does not meet her/his expectation, the 
monitoring process, which detects this failure, will enable the hearer to choose a further 
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interpretation based on utterance meaning and contextual information (e.g., to derive 
implicature).  
 
Secondly, epistemic vigilance and Monitoring are governed by similar constraints. 
According to Sperber et al. (2010) and Mazzarella (2015b), the activation of epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms depends on the relevance of the communicated content and the 
allocation of cognitive resources. As mentioned earlier, Monitoring is also subject to 
distraction. In this sense, attentional failure affects the performance of both epistemic 
vigilance and Monitoring. Thus, when the hearer is not fully attending in a conversation, s/he 
might have difficulty concentrating on the utterance the speaker says. This would prevent 
her/him from detecting errors or mistakes of the speaker or her/his own interpretive mistakes 
(e.g., accepting Neil1 to be the referent in our example).  
 
In the Neil case, the hearer Carston might initially take the name “Neil” to be her son, and 
then only on her way back home might she realize that it refers to her colleague. The 
selection of the wrong referent might be due to failure to detect the inconsistency or inability 
to solve the problem. The former might be caused by the hearer’s lack of attentional 
resources or the failure of information retrieval to allow detection of the inconsistency (i.e., a 
failure of Monitoring). Consider the following example, 
 
A: So, is this your first film? 
B: No, it’s my twenty-second. 
A: Any favourites among the twenty-two? 
B: Working with Leonardo. 
A: da Vinci? 
B: DiCaprio. 
A: Of course. And is he your favourite Italian director? 
(Richard Curtis, Notting Hill, 1999) 
 
This conversation is extracted from an interview with the movie star B. Apparently B 
presupposes that A knows that Leonardo refers to the famous actor Leonardo DiCaprio. But 
judging from what A says, we infer that A mistakenly took Leonardo to be Leonardo da 
Vinci. But A is not sure about his understanding of the referent, so A replies with a question. 
Of course, the conversation, when placed within the broader context (e.g. a comedy film), is 
designed by the author of the film with the aim of yielding some humorous cognitive effects. 
Those effects are only achieved because the conversation is plausible or realistic. Presumably 
the reason for A getting the wrong referent is that Leonardo di Vinci is the most accessible 
person named “Leonardo” to A (Leonardo da Vinci is extremely famous). His failure to 
detect the inconsistency – that B could not have worked with da Vinci – might be due to A 
paying inadequate attention to the topic or the context or to the ignorance of A to the fact that 
da Vinci has nothing to do with acting.   
 
The above analysis is consistent with the process of Monitoring as included in our model. 
It is not always reliable, and is constrained by attentional resources and cognitive control. Our 
model has the interpretive power to elaborate how correct utterance interpretation is arrived 
at, but also to indicate which factors lead to misunderstanding. As the specific operation of 
Monitoring depends upon learned pragmatic schemata, these will be explored further in the 
next section. 
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4.3 On the Nature of Pragmatic Schemata 
The Monitoring process ensures that the developing situational model is coherent by applying 
a set of condition/action rules or pragmatic schemata. The general form of these schemata is 
that the conditions specify limitations on the contents of Working Memory (i.e., on the 
situational model) and the actions specify strategies for addressing these limitations. Thus, 
the specific pragmatic schema required for the Neil example (see the rule for Monitoring in 
the appendix) specifies that if the suspected referent of a referring expression is not known to 
the speaker then that suspected referent should be disqualified as the referent. When this rule 
fires it results in reinterpretation of the referent. One might ask where such schematic rules 
come from? Our view is that they are learned in very early childhood through observation 
and practice of verbal communication – either successful communication or 
misunderstanding of others.  
 
As suggested by Recanati (2007), the Neil example involves the ability to metarepresent 
the speaker (e.g., the speaker is saying something). Such metapresentational ability has close 
links with children’s general competence of attributing thoughts to others so as to predict or 
explain their behaviour. Evidence from developmental psychology reflects children’s early 
use of such competence. For example, infants can identify what object an adult is labelling by 
referring to the adult’s gaze (Baldwin, 1991), pick out the object that causes an adult’s 
disgust towards it (Baldwin & Moses, 1994), and even learn the meaning of names by relying 
on some intuitive biases that derive from the ability to attribute thoughts to others (Bloom, 
2002). 
 
Compared with the above tasks, pragmatic interpretation is much more complex as it 
involves processing different types of information, such as linguistic, perceptual, and 
conceptual information, and it also requires metarepresentational abilities (Zufferey, 2015). 
Yet “children progressively become more skilled with the attribution of intentions in the 
context of verbal communication” (Zufferey, 2015, p. 91). In the transitional period, as 
children become progressively more skilled, abstract concepts (e.g., “goal”, “intention”, 
“know”, etc.) are assumed to be grasped through an interaction between early mind-reading 
abilities and language development (de Villiers, 2007). Metarepresentational abilities are 
closely associated with the attribution of intentions, so such abilities also develop out of 
children’s constant practice in the domain of verbal communication, which requires 
understanding of the speaker’s communicative intention behind the utterance. On this account, 
those who have not acquired relevant abstract concepts or developed metarepresentational 
abilities might be unable to deliver the right interpretation of the name Neil. But when these 
conditions are satisfied, it is reasonable to assume that at first cognitive effort is required to 
deal with such situations so as to infer the speaker’s intended referent. General problem 
solving may be required. However, as the appropriate strategy becomes proceduralized 
through constant use, the associated schema becomes established within Monitoring.   
4.4 Comparison with Other Cognitive Architectures and Computational Approaches 
We have presented our account within the context of a cognitive architecture based on the 
CS/SS framework of Norman and Shallice (1986), but many other cognitive architectures 
have been proposed. Of these other architectures, ACT-R (Anderson, 2007) is the most 
widely cited. It proposes that the cognitive system comprises a number of special purpose 
modules whose interactions are coordinated through a central production system. ACT-R 
modules correspond to computational functions, rather than psychological faculties. They 
include input systems (e.g., visual and auditory modules), output systems (e.g., the motor 
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module) and central modules (e.g., the intentional, declarative and imaginal modules). Each 
special-purpose module operates on its own content, and potentially in parallel. Furthermore, 
each module interfaces with the central production system through its own dedicated buffer. 
The central production system can read from and write to each of these buffers, thereby 
responding to input, triggering module-specific processing, and effecting motor activity. 
 
ACT-R is of specific interest in the current context because a) its extensible nature allows 
further modules to be added to the architecture; and b) ACT-R’s declarative memory is 
activation-based, with mechanisms supporting spreading activation and with the level of an 
item’s activation determining its accessibility (as discussed above). With respect to the 
former, Lewis and Vasishth (2005) have exploited ACT-R’s extensibility in their work on 
language comprehension and one could, for example, envisage a special purpose pragmatic 
module, which would be consistent with proposals of Sperber and Wilson (2002). With 
respect to the latter, ACT-R’s activation-based mechanism offers a straightforward account as 
to why, in the Neil problem, the representation of Carston’s son would be highly active and 
hence likely to be selected in the absence of a pragmatic violation. 
 
Despite these strengths, ACT-R was not adopted here for two reasons. First, it does not 
distinguish between automatic and controlled processing, and second it does not treat 
monitoring as a distinct, separable cognitive process. Thus, while our account might be 
implemented within ACT-R, the ACT-R architecture would serve only as an implementation 
medium, and not as a background cognitive theory. Our adoption of the CS/SS architecture 
reflects a commitment to the psychological reality of the functional processes of this 
architecture within pragmatic interpretation. 
 
More broadly, Poznański (1992) is one of the few previous researchers who has adopted a 
computational approach to implement the proposals of RT in utterance processing. Crystal, 
constructed by Poznański (1992), is a relevance-based utterance processing model that aims 
to provide a fine-grained computational account of the mechanisms involved and the 
interaction between them for achieving maximal relevance. Within Crystal, information from 
general input systems competes for access to a deductive device, and semantic segments of a 
given utterance from the language module are added incrementally to this device. Long-term 
knowledge in the form of concept-indexed chunks, each of which contains encyclopaedic, 
logical and lexical information, is stored in a conceptual memory. The three types of 
information of active chunks are copied respectively to the deductive memory, logical (meta-) 
rules and the language module. The deductive memory also receives source-labelled 
contextual implications produced by the inference process. Reason maintenance ensures 
logical consistency of the content in the deductive memory.  
 
There are similarities between Crystal and our approach. For example, the deductive 
memory in Crystal is functionally similar to Working Memory in our model, as both can store 
information from encyclopaedic entries (world knowledge) and input from conceptual 
memory (lexical representations) and output of the inference process (contextual 
implications). The reason maintenance system of Crystal also shares some similarity with our 
Monitoring process, though as stressed above in our model Monitoring is a task-general 
cognitive subprocess, rather than a process specifically related to utterance interpretation. 
However, Crystal lacks a mechanism for spreading activation. Crystal’s approach to semantic 
disambiguation instead relies on Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) definition of relevance that 
equates mental effort with the number of assumptions used. This approach is inadequate in 
the case of the Neil example. Arguably, Crystal’s inadequacy in resolving ambiguity might 
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be attributed to the fact that the work was accomplished before the addition of the 
communicative principle of relevance, which requires the interpretive hypothesis to be the 
most relevant, and to also match the speaker’s abilities and preferences. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a solution for the Neil problem with a detailed computational 
account of pragmatic processing of referent resolution in utterance interpretation. The 
implementation of this example has shown how the hearer takes the path of least effort in 
searching for the interpretation of “Neil” and also how the speaker’s personal knowledge 
about the referent is integrated with an evolving situational model in working memory. In 
order to support our proposed solution we have implemented two component processes of 
“hypothesis formation” and “hypothesis confirmation” within a general architecture of mind. 
Our account, to some extent, resolves the debate between the relevance-theoretic and 
association-based accounts of the Neil example.  
 
As noted above, a key claim of RT is that the optimally relevant interpretation should 
match the speaker’s abilities and preferences. The example discussed in this paper concerns 
the speaker’s knowledge of an individual hypothesized as the referent. While we have 
focused on Carston’s Neil problem, this problem is an instance of a more general pragmatic 
phenomenon where the hearer’s assumptions of the speaker’s knowledge are involved in the 
referent resolution process. We also need to explore how other kinds of speaker-related 
information might influence utterance interpretation. This question is closely related to the 
range of conversational constraints embedded within Monitoring that function to detect 
pragmatic violations by referring to world knowledge. Additional work is required both to 
elaborate further constraints and to evaluate how performance factors, such as cognitive load, 
affect the functioning of the architectural components. 
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Appendix: Model Details 
The model described above is implemented in the COGENT cognitive modelling 
environment (Cooper & Fox, 1998; Cooper, 2002). COGENT is a graphical programming 
environment that allows cognitive models to be specified in terms of processes and storage 
buffers (as in Figure 1), and with the operation of processes defined in terms of if/then 
production-like rules. The following sections provide the precise rules used to implement the 
key processes in the model. The implementation also includes an incremental chart-parsing 
module adapted from chapter 7 of Cooper (2002). 
Maintain Situational Model: 
The process that maintains the situational model contains rules which copy semantic content 
produced by the parsing process into Working Memory, as well as a rule for binding discourse 
referents (e.g., entities introduced by proper names) with known individuals. The critical rule 
for the latter is as follows: 
 
IF: entity(X) is in Working Memory 
identity(X, _) is not in Working Memory 
name(X, Name) is in Working Memory 
name(Individual, Name) is in World Knowledge 
THEN: add identity(X, Individual) to Working Memory 
 
 
After parsing of the word “Neil”, its semantic unit — entity(X) — is added to Working 
Memory (by other rules associated with maintaining the situational model). At this stage X 
has not been identified in Working Memory with a known individual since it is the first time 
X occurs in the conversation. X’s name is Name, which in the current example will be 
instantiated as “Neil”. This information will also have been added to Working Memory by 
other rules associated with maintaining the situational model. The above rule consults the 
hearer’s World Knowledge for known individuals whose name is Name. When the conditions 
in if-part are all satisfied, the action will be initiated to add the information that effectively 
binds the entity X with the individual whose name is Name. As introduced in section 2.2, the 
most accessible referent will be bound with the corresponding semantic unit if the latter has 
more than one potential referent within World Knowledge.   
 
Monitoring: 
In a fuller model, Monitoring will contain many schemata that implement goal-specific 
processing and pragmatic constraints. These schemata will also have associated activation 
values. For current purposes, we ignore the goal-specific and activation-based aspects of 
schemata and consider just the one schema critical to this form of referent resolution: 
 
IF: identity(X, Individual) is in Working Memory 
metadata(speaker, Utterance, Speaker) is in Working Memory 
metadata(refers_to, Utterance, X) is in Working Memory 
knows(Speaker, Individual, false) is in World Knowledge 
THEN: delete identity(X, Individual) from Working Memory 
 
 
With X identified as a specific individual, and attributing the utterance to the speaker, this 
conversational constraint (that the speaker has knowledge of the referent) functions to 
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retrieve the information that “it is false the speaker knows the individual” (the fourth 
condition of the rule). Hence the entity X is found to be assigned an invalid identity because it 
violates the conversational constraint. The preliminary mapping between X and the individual 
should therefore be deleted from Working Memory. 
 
Revise Interpretation: 
Removal of the preliminary mapping of a referent to an individual triggers the Revise 
Interpretation process. While in a more complete architecture, the function of Revise 
Interpretation would be fulfilled by a general problem solving process, just one rule is critical 
for the current example: 
 
IF: name(X, Name) is in Working Memory 
identity(X, AnyIndividual) is not in Working Memory  
metadata(speaker, U, S) is in Working Memory  
knows(S, Individual, true) is in World Knowledge 
name(Individual, Name) is in World Knowledge  
THEN: excite name(Individual, Name)in World Knowledge by 0.0500 
 
 
When Working Memory is found to contain a named referent X that has not been identified 
with an individual, but where an individual with the referent’s name is believed by the hearer 
to be known by the speaker, then the representation of that individual in World Knowledge 
should be excited, so as to aid retrieval by the above rule in Maintain Situational Model. This 
rule will fire repeatedly until an appropriate individual is identified with the referent (i.e., 
until the second condition no longer holds). 
 
